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NOTES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION- ARISING OUT OF AND
IN THE COURSE OF AN ENIGMA
The twentieth century rolled resolutely into America on the clattering wheels of a dozen social buckboards. Among the sturdiest of
these wagons, some of which looked more like chariots, was one that
carried the hopes of those who daily faced the perils of industrial irresponsibility. Workmen's compensation legislation was not the only
strongbox taken from that wagon, but it probably was the roomiest.
It had to be large; although it contained the walking papers for the
three deadly sisters, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
the fellow-servant rule, it also held packets of notes made by perplexed
Germans and Englishmen' who, in attempts to evaluate the new
theory of employers' liability, anticipated the frustration of America's
continuing desire to list the concrete characteristics of an injury that
"should" be borne by industry.
By far the most vexing of the problems is the definition of that
"deceptively simple and litigiously prolific"2 phrase "arising out of
and in the course of" the employment. Not all the statutes contain
this precise phrase, but all courts seem to agree 3 that the major delimiting factor of the employer's liability is two-fold: (1) the injury
must arise out of the employment, that is, it must bear a satisfactory
causal relation to the risks created by or existing in the employment;4
'Germany first conceived of the theory that work injuries should be compensated not because of negligence but because of their relation to the job, circa
1884. The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" began its
eventful life in England. For a discussion of the history of workmen's compensation
legislation, see HORovrrz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws 2 (1944); LARSON, VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§5.10-.30 (1952).
2Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947) (dictum).
3But cf. note 12 infra and accompanying text, discussing the compilation of the
two tests by the Louisiana court. The statutes of North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Washington do not specifically require that the injury "arise out of the employment" in order to be compensable, but each has other characteristics that
have been interpreted as requiring a causal connection. HoRovrrz, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 154, n.l.
4This is now a moot question, but it is probable that a statute that does not
expressly or impliedly contain this causative test would be violative of the fourteenth amendment. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923);
Brown, "Arising out of and in the Course of the Employment" in Workmen's Com-
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and (2) the injury must occur while the employee is in the course of
his employment, that is, under inert circumstances at a time and a
place in which the employee may reasonably find himself in the
pursuit of his employer's business. Beyond these relatively meaningless standards the courts agree on very little. The statutory test thus
stated was nominally adopted as a substitute for the "proximate cause"
criterion that allocated the risks of like injuries and deaths prior to
the passage of the acts. To the anonymous Englishman who invented
the new phrase, and doubtless to his American counterpart, proximate cause was a concept too sophisticated to serve the utilitarian purpose of compensating injured workmen with a minimum of delay,
too compartmentalized to represent the humanitarian impulse to pay
a workman or his family part of the salary that he could not earn because of injury or death caused to some extent by his employment.
The idea was to avoid punishing the employee for his human frailties,
and to place the burden on shoulders that could more easily bear the
strain. The three common law defenses were abrogated; that is, their
names were forever banished from the opinions.
The common law defenses were not evolved as reasons why the
employee should be made to suffer his own loss, but as reasons why
he should not be permitted to foist it on someone else -this was
often forgotten in the formative years of the phrase's definition. When
the legislatures eliminated the specific defenses the burden was only
apparently taken from the back of the worker; in fact, all that was
done was to create a need for new words to represent the same essential belief, now substantially relaxed, that the employer should
not be made to bear the cost of all injuries that befall his employees.
The new words have been slow in coming, for the courts have faced
with no little consternation the habitual impulse to employ tried
and true terms to reach decisions justifiable under a new standard.
The old common law phrases "scope of employment," 5 "foreseeability," "contributory negligence, " 7 and "proximate cause" s have been
occasionally used to indicate the unsophisticated conclusion that a
particular injury, on its facts, was or was not close enough to the
pensation Acts-Part I, 7 Wis. L. Rv. 15, 18 (1931).
51llount v. State Road Dep't, 87 So.2d 507, 510 (Fla. 1956) (dictum); PRossER,
TORTS 529 (1941); Brown, supra note 4, at 24.
6Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tenn. 1954) (dictum).
7Shultz v. Nation Associates, Inc., 281 App. Div. 915, 916, 119 N.Y.S.2d 673,
674 (3d Dep't 1953) (dictum).
sMcNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 499, 102 N.E. 697 (1913) (dictum).
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activity that was carried on by the employee for the benefit of the
employer before, during, or after the accident.
Time, however, cures all ills, and it was not long before the courts
had more than the naked statutory test to go by. Finding the words
of the statute to be rather useless without the manageable concepts
of causation that were now suspect at best, the courts, courageously
at first, then habitually, shucked their metaphysics and began to classify compensable injuries according to the situations in which they occurred. In this manner such categories as "going and coming cases,"
"hotel fire cases," "shower fall cases," and "asphyxiation cases" came
into being;9 and, put to the test of justice in subsequent cases, they
created within themselves numerable refinements that are intelligible
only in their own major categories, and not transferable from one
category to another. Lawyers have discovered that any given case
may fit comfortably into any one of several categories o and that exceptions that govern the case cannot be determined until the major
category is chosen. The categories and their subcategories multiply
with the appearance of each advance sheet; the digesters, who long ago
ceased to worry about theoretical inconsistency in any given jurisdiction, simply list a new heading to include the most recent decision.
Occasionally a court bravely "returns to the meaning of the words
themselves," referring to the cryptic phrase used in the statutes. More
frequently still do the judges throw up their hands on viewing the
DThe categories listed in 71 C.J., Workmen's Compensation Acts §§396-477
(1935), are perhaps the most exhaustive; note that the cases are generally classified
according to the time, place, and immediate cause of the injury, and the subdivisions
of each category include the cases analyzing the usual risks of different types of
employments. Ideally, it might be preferable to invert the order, in view of the
legislation's purpose to place on each type of business the risks of the activities of
each type of employee. This, however, is a job for a statistician rather than for
a judge or lawyer.
loConsider, e.g., the case of John Doe, a salesman. He was attending a sales
convention in a distant city. He picked his own hotel, but the room was paid for
by his employer. While shaving in preparation for an engagement with a lady
whom he intended to meet in the lounge for about ten minutes before the next
session of the convention, he jumped with surprise as lightning struck the hotel
building, which had a defective lightning rod, and cut himself severely with his
razor. This might be a hotel risk case, an Act of God case, a necessary ministration
case, or a purely personal mission case. For more believable circumstances that
illustrate the same problem, see Buck v. Katherine Gibbs School, Inc., 277 App.
Div. 126, 98 N.Y.S.2d 734 (3d Dep't), appeal denied, 95 N.E.2d 57 (1950); Lief v.
A. Walzer & Son, 248 App. Div. 651, 287 N.Y. Supp. 991 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 272 N.Y.
542, 4 N.E.2d 727 (1936); Davidson v. Pansy Waist Co., 240 N.Y. 584, 148 N.E. 715
(1925).
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conflicting precedents and close their opinions with a vague but sensitive plea for liberality toward the worker.
Although the statutory test is two-fold, the practical distinction
between "arising out of" and "in the course of" has become at best
nebulous. The theoretical definitions offered by the Illinois court
were quoted with approval in the Florida case of Bituminous Casualty
Corp. v. Richardson:11
" 'The words "arising out of" refer to the origin of the cause
of the accident, while the words "in the course of employment"
refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the
accident occurs.' This is a clear and concise construction of
these words as used in the statute."
However "clear and concise" the distinction between the tests may be
in theory, it is difficult to find, in an ordinary case denying compensation, a conclusion as to which of the tests the claimant failed to meet.
The courts have been uniformly uninterested in making the bare
words of either statutory test lead to concrete solutions, and have
turned rather to the broad theories discussed here or to the factual
categories of precedent that overflow the digests and treatises. Perhaps
the best proof of this point is the fact that the courts do not disagree
materially on the theoretical distinction between the two phrases,
a phenomenon not to be found in evaluating the phrases that come
closer to producing concrete conclusions.
The amalgamation of the two tests produces some uncertainty
as to which has given way to the other in order to produce the synthesis. "Arising out of" seems to best describe the risks that produce compensable injuries, so it may be that "in the course of" has become the
relatively meaningless term. It is difficult to find a case in which the
injury arose out of but not in the course of the employment, as the
terms are used today. At least one court 12 has stated, however, that
the sole surviving test is whether the injury occurred in the course of
the employment. Because the useful theories that have appeared are
not concerned with the technical distinction, and because the distinction neither helps nor hinders courts in reaching decisions justifiable under more manageable theories, the difference between "arising
out of" and "in the course of" will not be discussed here.
11148 Fla. 323, 325, 4 So.2d 378, 379 (1941).
12St. Alexandre v. Texas Co., 28 So.2d 385, 389 (La. 1946) (dictum).
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This note does not contain a discussion of the various fact categories that constitute, for the most part, the body of the law regarding
this subject. The classifications and their cases can be found elsewhere
in laborious detail. This is an attempt to review the theoretical
language used by the courts in building and rebuilding the categories.
FIVE AUTHORITATIVE THEoRIES

Peculiar risk
One of the original tests has proved to be among the hardiest. It
was transplanted from its English habitat by the Massachusetts court
in McNicol's Case, 3 which was the first of a long line of cases in the
category that awards compensation to innocent workmen who, while
14
doing their work, are injured by attacks of their fellow employees.
5
The court stated what it conceived to be the proper test of causation:"
"[Ilt excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the
employment as a contributing proximate cause and which
comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been
equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative
danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the
neighborhood."
The accuracy with which this language reflected the feelings of the
Massachusetts court became evident four years later, when a salesman
slipped on an icy street while making his morning rounds. He was
denied compensation because the risk that befell him was common
to everyone who walked the streets of Lowell that morning.,"
By 1925 the "peculiar risk" theory was so solidly entrenched that
the New York court required only one short paragraph to reverse
an award for a traveling salesman who scalded himself in an accidental
fall in a hotel room shower:'1
13215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913).
4This category is now self-sufficient, and the exceptions to the general rule are
fairly well crystalized. See Annot., 112 A.L.R. 1258 (1938); Small, The Effect of
Workmen's Compensation Trends on Agency-Tort Concepts of Scope of Employment, 11 NACCA L.J. 19 (1953).
'15215 Mass. 497, 499, 102 N.E. 697 (1913).
16Donahue's Case, 226 Mass. 595, 116 N.E. 226 (1917).
17Davidson v. Pansy Waist Co., 240 N.Y. 584, 148 N.E. 715 (1925); see also Hall
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"While it may be that at the time the claimant sustained his
injuries he was making himself ready to perform his regular
daily work as a salesman, such preparation cannot be said to
be part of his employment, and it does not appear that he might
not have prepared himself in exactly the same way if engaged
in any other employment or vocation. The injury did not arise
out of and in the course of his employment."
The pitfalls of this language as a device to delimit liability soon
became evident. In order to discover whether the employment contained some peculiar risk, courts had to identify the risks "common
to the neighborhood." The persons or places that comprised the
neighborhood were not easily identified. When the employee is
aboard ship in the Atlantic or battling mosquitoes in Africa, is the
relevant neighborhood still that of a quiet town in Kansas? If so, the
risks of torpedoes' s and malaria 9 certainly qualify as peculiar risks,
although they might be common to all, regardless of vocation, who
sail on ships or go on safaris.
Although the "neighborhood" was a concept flexible enough to
allow most courts to do what they wanted to do, the overwhelming
trend has been to abandon the language first offered by the McNicol
case.2 0 Requiring a precedent that was still more flexible, the courts
ceased to speak of kinds of risks and began to investigate degrees of
risks common to all.
v. City of New York, 258 App. Div. 830, 15 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dep't), afj'd, 282 N.Y.
708, 26 N.E.2d 822 (1940).
LsSee Foley v. Home Rubber Co., 89 NJ.L. 474, 99 At. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1917). The
employee, bound for the London office of his employer, lost his life when the
Lusitania was sunk by German U-boats. Avoiding the peculiar risk theory, the
court awarded compensation because the perils of the sea, including icebergs, storms,
and enemy attacks, were foreseeable by the employer. See a further discussion of
this theory under Foreseeability of Risk, infra.
19Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills, Inc., 288 N.Y. 377, 43 N.E.2d 450 (1942).
The employee died from an attack of malaria contracted in Africa, where he was
selling garments for his employer. Compensation was awarded.
2
oSee HoRovlIz, op. cit. supra note 1, at 104; Brown, "Arising out of and in
the Course of the Employment" in Workmen's Compensation Acts-Part III, 8
Wis. L. REv. 134, 140 (1933). In Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. The Industrial Comm'n,
62 Ariz. 398, 415, 159 P.2d 511, 518 (1945) (dictum), the court awarded compensation to an employee who was injured by an exploding soft drink bottle and gave this
convincing reason for rejecting the peculiar risk test:
"A machine must be given oil and cared for.... Likewise, employees working under the conditions as shown in this case of necessity must have sus-
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Increased risk
Although the peculiar risk theory could be used comfortably to
award compensation to persons engaged in unique employments and
injured by risks unheard of in everyday life, these cases were few and
far between. To cope with the problems raised by more common
injuries, the courts found causation in injuries occasioned by universal risks that were increased in degree by the employment.
The Connecticut court in an early case 21 awarded compensation
for the death of a traveling salesman in a hotel fire. Recognizing that
the risk of death by fire was common to everyone and that the risk
of death by hotel fire was common to all who stayed in hotels, the
22
court stated:
"The salesman who is required to lodge in hotels is not in the
position of the average citizen in a community, who seldom
lodges in a hotel unless at the time he is making it his permanent or temporary home. The salesman's risk from fire in hotels,
especially those in a territory such as this, is much greater than
the casual lodger, and one which both the employer and the
employee might have anticipated."
This theory has enjoyed much stature in the courts, 23 but it has had
its difficulties. As was true of the McNicol root for the peculiar risk
doctrine, this language has been twisted in meaning by courts whose
humanitarian impulses outrun their capacities to develop new phrases.
In a recent Mississippi case 24 compensation was awarded for the
death of an employee who worked with a dragline for a construction
tenance. An accident arising from any preparation of their food, or in
eating, is just as much an accident arising out of the employment as in the
case of caring for a machine or any other appliance.... It is no answer to
this to say that the accident was of such a character as might have occurred
at the employee's home or elsewhere, and that the employment in no way
contributed to or caused the bottle to explode. To take such a position is
to venture into realms of possibility."
2lHarivel v. The Hall-Thompson Co., 98 Conn. 753, 120 AUt. 603 (1923).
221d. at 758, 120 Ati. at 605.
23See, e.g., Fort Pierce Growers Ass'n v. Storey, 158 Fla. 192, 29 So.2d 205 (1946);
Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So.2d 342 (1944); Alexander
Orr, Jr., Inc. v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 129 Fla. 369, 176 So. 172 (1937). But see
Bowen v. Keen, 154 Fla. 161, 169, 17 So.2d 706, 710 (1944) (dictum).
24Pigford Bros. Constr. Co. v. Evans, 83 So.2d 622 (Miss. 1955).
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company. He was killed when a tornado struck the area and decapitated him with a boat rudder carried in its wake. Recognizing
that the risk of being decapitated by tornado-blown boat rudders
was common to all who found themselves exposed at the time, the
court awarded compensation because the unfortunate employee was
in an unusually exposed position on top of a six-foot tall machine
when the accident occurred. This seems to be a desirable conclusion,
but the reasoning is suspect. The reasonable inference is that if the
employee merely had been working beside the machine his risk
would not have been increased and his family's award not forth25
coming.
This theory was used to award compensation for the death of a
governmental contractor's employee who drowned while swimming
off the island of Guam, beyond the employer-established safety zone,
in an attempt to rescue persons in distress2s The cryptic but authoritative words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter state the theory:27
"The test of recovery is not a causal relation between the nature
of employment of the injured person and the accident.... Nor
it is necessary that the employee be engaged at the time of the
injury in activity of benefit to his employer. All that is required is that the 'obligations or conditions' of employment
create the 'zone of special danger' out of which the injury arose."
Exposure to Conditions and Forces
The "zone of special danger" has in many cases proved to be too
confining to hold the liberal inclinations of the courts. In Caswell's
25See dissenting opinion, Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720,
738, 6 So.2d 747, 753 (1942), in which compensation was awarded for the death
of an employee in the collapse of the employer's building as the result of a cyclone.
Odom, J., dissenting, gave all the synonyms for peculiar risk:
"If the workman is employed to work in a place and under circumstances
exposing him to more than ordinary risk by lightning, cyclone, or other
fortuitous event; if the position which he must necessarily occupy in connection with his work results in excessive exposure to a risk common to all
mankind; if the continuity or exceptional amount of exposure aggravates or
augments the common risk; if he incurs a greater risk, necessitated by his
employment, than a person outside such employment would incur; if he is
subjected to an added risk by reason of his employment, then the accident
arises 'out of' the employment, but not otherwise."
26O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
271d. at 506.
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Case28 the same court that started all the "peculiar risk" trouble with
McNicol's Case29 painted a broad new theory of compensable injuries: 30
"It need not arise out of the nature of the employment. An
injury arises out of the employment if it arises out of the nature,
conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment; in other
words, out of the employment looked at in any of its aspects....
An employee who, in the course of his employment, is hurt
by contact with something directly connected with his employment, receives a personal injury arising out of his employment,
even though the force that caused the contact was not related
to his employment."
Under this doctrine, whose boundaries are uncharted and unchartable,
the Massachusetts court awarded compensation to an employee injured when his employer's roof fell in during a hurricane. In situations in which a decision still could be made by reference to broad
theory rather than to crystallized precedents in factual categories,
the controlling question in liberal courts ceased to be, "Did the employment increase the risk of this particular injury?" and became,
"Did the employment in fact bring him in contact with the risk that
caused the injury?"31 It no longer mattered much that some other
activity might also bring him into contact with the same degree of
32

-

the same risk.
28305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940).
Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913). See discussion, p. 315 supra.
Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1940).
3'See Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944), in which a traveling
2D215
30305

serviceman, who was available for service to his employer at all hours, chose his
own lodging and died in a hotel fire. The court stated, id. at 334, 55 N.E.2d at 612:
"The question is not whether that risk was greater than the similar risk at
some other place where the employee might have stayed, or at his own home,
if his employment had not called him away from home. The question is
whether his employment brought him in contact with the risk that in fact
caused his death."
See also Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. The Indus. Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d 511
(1945); Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Warren, 172 Tenn. 403, 413-14, 112 S.W.2d
837, 841 (1938) (dictum).
32See Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 719, 731, 6 So.2d 747,
750 (1942) (dictum):
"With due deference to the jurisprudence to the contrary, it seems to us that

the laborious efforts of some of the courts in weighing the evidence in order
to discern whether the hazard to the employee has been increased by reason
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The ramifications of this development are evident. In cases of
first impression and in those in which courts could find some factual
distinction to relieve themselves of the obligation to their own precedents, the causal connection often became no more precise than the
fact that an accident happened. The Louisiana court, for example,
spoke
boldly for the new theory in Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil
83
CO.:

"[A]ny accident which befalls an employee, in consequence of
a force to which he is subjected because he is required to be at
a particular place at the time the force exerts itself, is one
arising out of and having causal connection with the employment."
There is a logical distinction 34 between a force, which affects a man
from outside an activity unrelated to his work at a place where he
could be doing something directly beneficial to his employer, and a
condition, which occurs as the result of a risk that would not have
existed had he been doing something else at the same place. The
Louisiana court, however, bridged the gap in short order. Four years
after uttering the words quoted above, the court in affirming an award
to an employee who cut his hand while opening a soft drink bottle
on the employer's premises summarized its holding in the Harvey
case as follows:3 5
of the employment are tenuous and involve considerable guesswork and
conjecture on the part of the judges."
33199 La. 719, 731, 6 So.2d 747, 750 (1942).
-4Compensation is the logical consequence of a finding that the employee was
injured by a "force"; a finding that his injury was the result of a "condition" of
his own making leads to the problem of whether what he was doing was a purely
personal mission or incident to the employment. The controlling factor in the
basic choice between "force" and "condition" is whether the risk that caused the
injury was so enveloping that it would have existed regardless of what he was
doing. The hotel fire cases are illustrative of this point. Compensation usually is
awarded in these cases, and judges are hesitant to undertake the difficult task of
discovering whether the employee was writing reports to his boss or playing poker
with the bellboys when the fire broke out. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. Shuttleworth, 61 Ga. App. 644, 7 S.E.2d 195 (1940); Standard Oil Co. v.
Witt, 283 Ky. 327, 141 S.W.2d 271 (1940); Carter v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d
211 (1939); HoRovrrz, op. cit. supra note 1,at 113. But cf. Lasear, Inc. v. Anderson,
99 Ind. App. 428, 437, 192 N.E. 762, 766 (1934) (dictum); Buck v. Katherine Gibbs
School, Inc., 277 App. Div. 126, 128, 98 N.Y.S.2d 734, 736 (3d Dep't), appeal denied,
95 N.E.2d 57 (1950) (dictum).
3
5St. Alexandre v. Texas Co., 28 So.2d 585, 389 (La. 1946).
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"[Wihenever an accident occurs in the course of employment,
no matter what may have been the cause of it, it must be held
to have arisen out of the employment."
Most courts have not proceeded with such abandon, feeling that
there are some personal acts whose conditions contain risks that are
too remote and that even those personal acts that are not too remote
need not be justified on such a broad front. The New York court
denied compensation to an employee who injured her eye with a
comb while primping in her employer's office, stating that the injury
arose from the "personal carelessness or negligence of the claimant in
the performance of a personal act."36 The court expressly distinguished the "force" cases in which the employee fell or was struck by
37
a falling object while pursuing a personal motive on the premises.
The converse of the peculiar risk theory in workmen's compensation is the "but for" test, which, as in common law causation cases,
is an over-simplified way of determining the risk that caused the accident. If it can be found that the employment was one of the controlling factors that brought the employee to the place where the
risk materialized, compensation can be awarded under this theory. 3s
Notwithstanding the sweeping possibilities of such language as
was used in the Caswell case, it is appearing with increasing frequency
in the dicta of judges who obviously have learned that in workmen's
compensation cases they do not have to make their decisions on the
basis of the language they use.
3GShultz v. Nation Associates, Inc., 281 App. Div. 915, 916, 119 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674
(3d Dep't 1953). But cf. Penzara v. Maffia Bros., 307 N.Y. 15, 119 N.E.2d 570 (1954),
in which the Shultz case was distinguished. The court awarded compensation to
a mechanic whose eye was injured by a spring clip that he was working on for his
own benefit, during working hours, with the consent and aid of his employer. The
employer, reasoned the court, hoped to better his relations with the employees in
this manner. Might not the same have been said of the Shultz employer had
he furnished his secretaries with a mirror before which they might preen themselves?
Was the absence of a mirror the controlling factor in the case?
37281 App. Div. 915, 916, 119 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (Sd Dep't 1953) (dictum).
3SThe conclusion, of course, is that "but for" the employment the accident
would not have occurred. See Marks v. Gray, 251 N. Y. 90, 93, 167 N.E. 181, 183
(1929) (dictum); Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 389, 397 (Tenn. 1954)
(dissenting opinion); Brown, supra note 4, at 88. This branch of the "exposure
to conditions and risks" tree has produced the "concurrent cause" doctrine, which
allows compensation if one of the significant causes of the act by the employee
that brings about the injury is related to the employment. See Cook v. Highway
Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1955).
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Foreseeability of Risk
At least one author has opined that the peculiar risk test is
"little more than an application of a foreseeability test."3

Possibly

because the theory of workmen's compensation asks the objective
question "Did in fact the risk exist in the employment" rather than
the subjective question "Should the employer, or the employee, have
foreseen the risk?," but more probably because judges have been
careful to avoid the use of hallowed tort terms, the concept of foreseeability is usually expressed by the phrase "peculiar risk," which
is sui generis to workmen's compensation.
"Foreseeability" has, however, found limited use. Its use does not
seem to have prevented courts from reaching decisions justifiable
4
under more comfortable phrases. In Foley v. Home Rubber Company
the New Jersey court awarded compensation to the family of a businessman who lost his life in the Lusitaniasinking, holding that the various
risks of the voyage were foreseeable.
The Tennessee court, distinguishing a hotel fire case 4' in which
compensation was awarded because the risk of fire was foreseeable,
denied compensation in another case4 2 because the employer could
not foresee the tornado that killed his employee who was riding with
fellow employees from their construction job to shelter at the direction of the employer. The dissenting judges rejected the foreseeability
test, observed that compensation would have been forthcoming had
the man been killed on the job, and then grumbled with some justification that "it is hard to get the wise distinction between being required to lay brick and being struck by the tornado and being re43
quired to ride the truck and getting hit by the tornado."
Necessary Incidents to Employment
The cases that might be listed under this heading are legion; since
this theory is most meaningful when viewed in the factual categories
that it has produced, it would not be discussed here were it not for
the fact that its origin cannot logically be found in any of the theories
discussed above. It seems to have been the first genuine theoretical
39Small, supra note 14, at 24.
4089 N.J.L. 474, 99 AtI. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
41Carter v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d 211 (1939).
42jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn. 1954).
431d. at 894.
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departure from common law causation, aside from the general "be
liberal" pleas that abound in the reports.
This theory recognizes that an employee must have an occasional
soft drink,4 4 attend to his lunch,45 respond to calls of nature,46
keep warm in cold weather, 47 treat his minor illnesses, 48 and smoke
cigarettes 49 at work as well as at home. Except in unusual cases, in
which the peculiar risk theory is always available to deny liability,
the risks of these and other related acts are generally borne by the
employer. At least one court eased into this theory by suggesting that
the satisfaction of these desires indirectly benefits the employer. 50
CAUSATION IN FLORIDA

Florida workmen's compensation legislation is comparatively
young; the original act was passed in 1935. 51 For this reason the
Florida Supreme Court has had an opportunity to profit by the
harrowing experiences of other courts with the elusive causative theory
promulgated by the statutes. For the most part this opportunity has
been taken; the Florida decisions are as intelligible and as consistent
as one could hope for, considering the magnitude of the task of finding words both to decide an immediate case and to provide authority
for subsequent cases.
At the time of the enactment of the Florida law the peculiar risk
theory was in full bloom, and it was almost immediately adopted by
the Florida Court. In Alexander Orr, Jr., Inc. v. Florida Industrial
Commission5 2 compensation was awarded to the family of a man
44See Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 19G S.E. 684 (1938).
45See Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 159 P.2d 511
(1945).
46See Hunter Packing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 1 Ill.2d 99, 115 N.E.2d 236
(1953).
47See Codell Constr. Co. v. Neal, 258 Ky. 603, 80 S.W.2d 530 (1935); McKenzie v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 205 Minn. 231, 285 N.W. 529 (1939).
4sSee Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wakefield, 108 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1939); Elliott
v. Industrial Accid. Comm'n, 21 Cal.2d 281, 131 P.2d 521 (1942).
49See Natco Corp. v. Mallory, 80 So.2d 274 (Ala. 1955); Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. Industrial Accid. Comm'n, 178 Cal. 505, 173 Pac. 1105 (1918).
50Penzara v. Maffia Bros., 307 N.Y. 15, 119 N.E.2d 570 (1954); Buck v. Katherine
Gibbs School, Inc., 277 App. Div. 126, 98 N.Y.S.2d 734 (3d Dep't), appeal denied, 95
N.E.2d 57 (1950); McClellan v. Neptune Storage, Inc., 264 App. Div. 800, 34
N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dep't), appeal denied, 289 N.Y. 853, 44 N.E.2d 423 (1942).
-'Fla. Laws 1935, c. 17481, as amended, FLA. STAT. c. 440 (1955).
52129 Fla. 369, 176 So. 172 (1937).
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who died of sunstroke while working on a sewer pipe with a blowtorch. The heat of the blowtorch was cited as the peculiar risk that
added to the heat of the sun in producing the death, thus distinguishing the situations of golfers and bathers. 53
The Alexander Orr case was custom-built for the idea of peculiar
risk, but this good fortune was short-lived. In Protectu Awning Shutter
Co. v. Cline5 4 the Court awarded compensation for the death of a
sixty-seven-year-old man whose head struck his employer's concrete
floor when he fainted from a heart condition. The reason suggested
by the Court for its conclusion was that the fall would have been less
likely to occur in the quiet of the employee's home.5 The Court confessed that it was a borderline case 56 and in a later decision 57 stated that
the hardness of the floor was an increased risk. The snares of peculiar
risk are evident in the Cline decision. There is a fantastic amount
of speculation involved in concluding that the noise of the workshop
contributed to the fainting spell and that the fall might not have
occurred on the concrete floor of the employee's basement. The Court
opined that had he fallen on a piece of machinery while at work
"an award would hardly be questioned," 58 and then slipped easily into
its conclusion that the injury arose out of and in the course of the
employment.
By comparing what did happen with what might have happened,
when involved in a theory as elusive as peculiar risk, courts may
reach just decisions in particular cases but they do little to provide
standards for future litigation. Consider, for example, the Alexander
Orrcase and disregard the fact that at the time the sunstroke occurred
531d. at 372, 176 So. at 173 (dictum).
54154 Fla. 30, 16 So.2d 342 (1944).
551d. at 31-32, 16 So.2d at 343 (dictum); see also Glasser v. Youth Shop, Inc.,
54 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1951), in which compensation was denied an employee who did
fall in his own home, after having completed some work that his employer allowed
him to take home.
5OProtectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 31, 16 So.2d 342, 343 (1944)
(dictum).
57Foxworth v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 86 So.2d 147, 151 (Fla. 1955) (dictum).
In this case the Court denied an award to a man who attended a convention in
a hotel and jolted against a chair in the lobby while rising to do some personal
shopping. Compensation was denied because no injury was found to have resulted
from the accident, but in dicta the Court considered the causative question. The
Cline case was characterized as the "outer" limits of the peculiar risk doctrine. Id.
at 151.
58154 Fla. 30, 32, 16 So.2d 342, 343 (1944).
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the employee was using a blowtorch. Had the employee used a blowtorch every day for a year prior to the date of the accident, but did not
use it on the day of the accident, the peculiar risk shown in that case
would not have been present. Using the ideas of the Cline case, however, the Court might easily have awarded compensation to the family
of the sunstroke victim because "an award would hardly be questioned"
had he been using the blowtorch at the time the stroke occurred.
There is a difference between a peculiar risk that might have caused
the accident under other circumstances and a peculiar risk that in
fact did cause the accident.
The Florida Court found a peculiar risk of death by lightning to a
citrus worker in the fact that the employer erected a tarpaulin to
protect his workers from rainstorms and chanced to suspend it between two trees that were taller than most in the area, and in the fact
that the employee was seated on a box of tools when the lightning
struck.5 9 This case was later cited as authority for an award to a
secretary who was injured by lightning while at work at her desk in
the employer's office;60 however, the Court was much less concerned
with showing that the secretary was subjected to a risk greater than
that in other buildings or in other offices in the same building.
The Florida Court has been relatively faithful to the theory of
peculiar risk when no factual category of domestic or acceptable
foreign precedent seemed to fit. Although the narrow view of McNicol's Case has been expanded to compensate injuries that occur
because of risks that are common to the community but are greater
in the employment, there is very little indication that the Florida
Supreme Court has taken the plunge into the sea of awards for injuries
caused by risks that exist everywhere to about the same degree.
-OFort Pierce Growers Ass'n v. Storey, 155 Fla. 769, 21 So.2d 451 (1945); see also
Bowen v. Hollywood, 7 Fla. Supp. 94 (Deputy Comm'r 1955), aff'd, Claim No.
T-95416, order of full Commission Sept. 1, 1955, in which a golf course maintenance
man was killed by lightning that hit the wooden shelter where he sought refuge
from a storm. The deputy mentioned testimony by an expert that the risk to
the employee was not greater because he had his feet on a wet metal lawn mower,
and then held that compensation should be awarded because the risk of death by
lightning was greater on a golf course than on a street lined with buildings. It
was frankly admitted that a golf course held no risk greater than that of any other
open area. The full Commission, in affirming the award, failed to grapple with the
problem. Here again is the most acute problem of peculiar risk: what is the
"neighborhood" that contains the usual risks with which to compare those of the
employment?
OLyng v. Rao, 72 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1954).
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In Zee v. Gary6' the Florida Court awarded compensation for
the death of a painter who leaned against a defective guardrail on
his employer's scaffold and fell to the ground when it broke. A
gentle hint that the "but for" test might be adopted in some Florida
cases appeared in the decision. The employer attempted to show
that the employee was intoxicated and that his condition contributed
to the accident. The Commission, affirmed by the circuit court, held
that the contention of intoxication was immaterial, since there was
no evidence that whatever intoxication existed was the "primary
cause" 62 of the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that
the employer failed to assume the burden of proving intoxication. The
Commission's holding was stated by the Court as follows: 63
"'[I]f the guard rail was not strong enough to carry [his]
weight ... if he was intoxicated, it necessarily follows that it
would not have been strong enough if he had been entirely
sober and there is no evidence to show that the injury would
have happened had it not been for the breaking of the guard
rail.'
When a case arises in which the immediate cause of the injury
emanates from the performance of an act personal to the employee,
the question is usually whether it was a "purely personal" act or an
act "necessarily incident" to the employment. Once this question is
asked, the equally troublesome questions of peculiar risk seem to go
without utterance. The Court has held that a man returning to his
office at night after taking his wife home was involved in a purely
personal act, 64 but that an employee who was hit by a car while retrieving his foreman's hat was doing something incidental to his
employment. 65 The Court suggested that a waitress could perform
her duties with more skill if her stiff neck were relieved, and compensated her for an injury that occurred when a night manager attempted to do so. 66 A fruit grove operator had two hungry employees
61137 Fla. 741, 189 So. 34 (1939).
62137 Fla. 741, 748, 189 So. 34, 37 (1939).
Unless intoxication is the primary
cause of the accident, it has no bearing in the causative problem. FLA. STAT.
§440.09 (3)(1955).
63137 Fla. 741, 748, 189 So. 34, 87 (1939).
64Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495 (1940).
6sBituminous Cas. Corp. v. Richardson, 148 Fla. 323, 4 So.2d 378 (1941).
66Stone-Brady, Inc. v. Heim, 152 Fla. 710, 12 So.2d 888 (1943).
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on his hands one afternoon, and neither had transportation to the
nearby town. The employer's foreman gave one, a fruit picker, permission to drive to town to get lunch, but the other, a truck driver,
did not ask for permission. While traveling together in a vehicle
driven by a third person the truck driver was killed and the picker
injured in an accident. The picker was awarded compensation because he had permission to go for lunch, which "would create the
strength and reserve of the employee to work, thereby resulting in
more efficient services in gathering fruit"; 6 7 but the claim for the death

of the truck driver was denied.," These cases may be distinguished on
the ground that the picker, unlike the driver, could work more
efficiently after eating his meal or because the picker, unlike the driver,
obtained express permission to go after his lunch. The former distinction is less than persuasive as a matter of fact, and the latter pinpoints an extraneous fact that has little to do with the risks that
caused the accident.
If the employee is doing something that benefits the employer, or
on his orders, the risks attending that activity are easily classified as
arising out of and in the course of the employment. 9 Employees who
are entering the employer's premises for the first time 70 or leaving the
premises late at night' are within the protection of the compensation
act. When the employee is en route to or from his place of work the
"going and coming rule," a well-crystallized category that usually
denies compensation, is invoked.72 An employee is protected, however,
while driving to his home town after being called away on his employer's business;' 3 and the case for compensation is relatively clear
if his contract with the employer contemplated frequent trips over
unusual distances,7 4 particularly if the employer provides transporta67Heller Bros. Packing Co. v. Lewis, 155 Fla. 430, 433, 20 So.2d 385, 387 (1945).
6sHeller Bros. Packing Co. v. Kendricks, 155 Fla. 428, 20 So.2d 387 (1945). But ef.
Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, Inc., 74 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954), in which compensation was awarded an employee who was injured in an automobile accident

while leaving work because of "extreme discomfiture" as the result of a sudden
storm.

6See Sanford v. A. P. Clark Motors, Inc., 45 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1950); Moody v.
Baxley, 158 Fla. 357, 28 So.2d 325 (1946).
7OSee St. Petersburg v. Cashman, 71 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1954).
71See Dean v. Orange Mem. Hospital, Claim No. U-53911, award of full Commission Jan. 6, 1955.
72See Duval Engr. & Contr. Co. v. Johnson, 154 Fla. 9, 16 So.2d 290 (1944).
73See Cohen v. Sloan, 137 Fla. 335, 188 So. 331 (1939).
74See Southern States Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 146 Fla. 29, 200 So. 375 (1941).
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tion.7 5 It is immaterial that the employee's pay does not begin until
he reaches his destination7r and that the employee drives the vehicle
involved in the accident 77 The Florida Court recently adopted the
"concurrent cause" rule,78 which compensates employees for injuries
sustained while on errands that have personal as well as business
purposes.
If it can be shown by the claimant that his duties are of such
continuing importance that he is apt to be called from his bed at any
hour to attend to the needs of the employer, compensation may be
based on the precedent in the "twenty-four-hour duty" category, notwithstanding the fact that the injury did not occur because of the risks
incident to his continuing availability but because of his usual activities preparatory to going to work at a specified time7 9 In Sweat v.
Allen so the Florida Court awarded compensation to a deputy sheriff
who was injured by an automobile while he was in transit to work
at his customary time. Since the duty of the claimant was to protect
the community from crime, a pursuit to which he might be called at
any time, the conclusion was that "he was, so to speak, on guard
twenty-four hours a day, with no increase in salary in proportion to
the time devoted." 8' It cannot be gainsaid that this calling contains
dire risks, but the fact remains that the risk that befell this claimant
was that of being hit by an automobile while he was walking to the
bus line in order to arrive at his jail post at the regular time. The
twenty-four-hour guard duty imagined by the Court was necessary to
escape the compulsions of its own cases hinged on peculiar risk.8 2 Even
7

5See Blount v. State Road Dep't, 87 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1956); Povia Bros. Farms
v. Velez, 74 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1954).
76See Kennedy v. Fulghum, 159 Fla. 896, 897, 32 So.2d 919, 920 (1947) (dictum).
77See Blount v. State Road Dep't, 87 So.2d 507, 510 (Fla. 1956) (dictum).
78Cook v. Highway Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1955). In adopting this rule the
Florida Court cited Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 55 So.2d
381 (1951), rev'd, 214 Miss. 626, 59 So.2d 294 (1952), each of which opinions contains an illuminating discussion of the theory.
79But see Bowen v. Keen, 154 Fla. 161, 172, 17 So.2d 706, 711 (1944) (dictum),
stating that the going and coming rule generally denies compensation when employees have regular hours of work.
80145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348 (1941).
S'id. at 738, 200 So. at 350.
s2See Bowen v. Keen, 154 Fla. 161, 17 So.2d 706 (1944), which awarded compensation for the death of an employee whose duty it was to tend to his employer's
incubator. He was subject to his employer's call at any hour and was instructed
each night on his duties for the next day. He was hit by an automobile while
walking to work one hour earlier than usual pursuant to his employer's wishes.
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granting that the deputy was on call twenty-four hours a day, the Court
has since stated that this is not enough; the employee either must be
on duty twenty-four hours a day or injured while acting pursuant to
83
a call that actually did come.
A hotel hostess whose duty it was to entertain guests was awarded
compensation for an injury incurred when she slipped in her shower
in her employer's hotel.8 4 The award was based on the shaky ground
that she was attempting to answer a telephone call from a guest who
felt the need for entertainment; the facts that she was on call at all
hours, that she stayed in her employer's hotel, and that she was expected to take an occasional bath in order to stay companionable for
the guests were not enough to justify compensation. Yet in a similar
case compensation was awarded the family of a corporation executive
who attended a convention for his employer and was scalded to death
when he fell in the shower8 5 The employee was taking his shower in
preparation for a dinner meeting that would combine business and
pleasure. The Industrial Commission affirmed the deputy's award
The Court admitted that he was subject to no peculiar risk, id. at 169, 17 So.2d
at 710 (dictum), but awarded compensation because he was on call 24 hours a day.
Although it was deemed relevant that he had 24-hour duty two nights previous
to the accident, this does not seem to bear on the risks to which he was subject
on the fatal morning.
83Hi-Acres, Inc. v. Pierce, 73 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1954) (dictum).
84Neuman v. Shelbourne Grand Hotel, 155 Fla. 491, 20 So.2d 677 (1945).
85Standard Accid. Ins. Co. v. Grady, Claim No. T-35959, award of full Commission June 27, cert. denied, 85 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1955). The full Commission not
only noted the Neuman decision but embraced it as authority for its conclusion
that Grady's death arose out of and in the course of the employment, saying,
"it is important to note that the Court [in the Neuman case] inferred that bathing
and neat grooming alone would have been sufficient for coverage had the Deputy
so found or deduced from the facts there present." Order of full Commission, p.
6. The apparent basis for this inference is this dictum of the Court, 155 Fla.
at 497, 20 So.2d at 679:
"In the case at bar while it was the appellant's custom to take a bath before
the dinner every evening, and while it was her duty to keep neat and well
groomed, we do not think the evidence here would justify us in going
so far as to hold that when the appellant was taking this particular bath
she was necessarily acting within the line and scope of her duty to her employer. But we recognize that this is a close question on this evidence."
It is at least arguable that the statement of the Commission in the Grady case
was unjustified. The Supreme Court did not intend to infer that it would accept
the deputy's conclusions of law. It may be that the turning point in the Neuman
case was one of fact and not of law, but it is difficult to imagine the other facts
that the hostess should have shown to demonstrate that she "was taking this
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of compensation, stating its holding in broad terms that are wholly
incompatible with the theory of peculiar risk:8 6
"Just what do these words mean? Too often, we fear, the
Courts and even the Commissions are prone to treat this phrase
as though it were (1) 'proximately caused by the employment,'
or (2) 'legally caused by the employment.' 'Arise,' however,
means commence, originate, happen or occur. 'Arise' does
have something to do with causal connection but there are many
shades of meaning to causal connection. It is our feeling that
the 'arising' of the function of the employment is passive while
'caused by' or 'proximately caused' are or should be active.
The employment is a condition out of which the event arises
rather than the force producing the event in an affirmative fashion. Physical causation by the surroundings is not required in
order to satisfy what is implied by this phrase of the Act. It is
sufficient if the general conditions under which the employee is
working at the time admit of the accident or event being occasioned by the movement of the employee, and such conditions,
surroundings and circumstances may be passive, active or inert."
The Supreme Court denied certiorari without opinion.87
BURDENS OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS IN FLORIDA

There is no ground more prolific than causation in workmen's
compensation for the growth of the never-ending struggle between
mere speculations and reasonable inferences. Although each claim
is rebuttably presumed to come within the provisions of the workmen's compensation legislation,88 there is decidedly no presumption
that the injury upon which the claim is based arose out of and in the
course of the employment.8 9 Although the Florida Court has been
unequivocal in its homage to this proposition, it has been known
to entertain a reasonable inference that "the deceased was engaged in
particular bath" for the benefit of her employer.
860rder of full Commission, p. 5.
8?Standard Accid. Ins. Co. v. Grady, 85 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1955).
88FLA. STAT. §440.26 (1) (1955). This presumption logically applies

to

the

provision that states the test of liability, §440.09 (1).
9Pridgen v. International Cushion Co., 88 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1956); Wesley v. Warth
Paint & Hdwe. Co., 52 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1951).
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the employer's business at the time of his death" 0 when the ascertainable facts were not conclusive.
Prior to the amendment of the Florida act in 1953 the orders
of deputy commissioners were appealable to the full Commission,
thence to the circuit court, and finally to the Supreme Court by way
of certiorari.01 Under this procedure a case became a judicial controversy only when it reached the circuit court on appeal,92 and the
circuit judge was empowered to consider the record of the case in
order to draw findings of fact.9 3 The only findings of fact that were

accorded a presumption of validity were those of the circuit judge. 94
The deputy commissioner's findings were regarded as the equivalent
of findings by a special master in a chancery proceeding. 5 Since the
enactment of amending legislation that eliminated the circuit court as
a stage in review proceedings 8 the findings of fact of the deputy commissioner are clothed in the Supreme Court with a rebuttable presumption of validity,9

7

and in some respects a finding that an injury

arose out of and in the course of the employment is a finding of fact.9 s
The net result is that the findings of a deputy receive the respect accorded to circuit judges.9 9
O0American Airmotive Corp. v. Moore, 62 So.2d 37, 39 (Fla. 1952); see also
Johnson v. Dicks, 76 So.2d 657, 661 (Fla. 1954) (dictum).
01FL,. STAT. §440.27 (1953).
92
nternational Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Tucker, 55 So.2d 720, 722 (Fla.
1951) (concurring opinion).
03Fiorida Forest & Park Serv. v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 480, 18 So.2d 251, 255
(1944) (dictum).
94See Cone Bros. Contr. Co. v. Alibrook, 153 Fla. 829, 832, 16 So.2d 61, 63 (1943)
(dictum).
OsSee Florida Forest & Park Serv. v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 18 So.2d 251 (1944).
DaFla. Laws 1953, c. 28241, §9.
07City Ice & Fuel Div. v. Smith, 56 So.2d 329, 330 (1952) (dictum).
OsSee Davis v. Board of County Comm'rs, Claim No. U-98247, award of full
Commission April 27, 1956, in which the Commission stated, "The Deputy Commissioner found, inter alia, that the claimant was injured by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment . . . when he fell to the ground and
fractured his left arm."
0OSee letter, Patrick H. Mears, Ass't Dir., Workmen's Comp. Div., Fla. Indus.
Comm'n, July 25, 1956: "You ask how we would compare the duties of a Deputy
Commissioner with those of a special master.... In a number of cases the Supreme
Court of Florida has compared the Deputy Commissioner to a Circuit Judge,
pointing out that the findings of fact and order of the Deputy Commissioner are
entitled to the same weight as those of a chancellor or circuit judge. Thus, it
seems to me that the duties of a Deputy Commissioner are similar to those of a
Circuit Judge .... "
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CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

Any thought that questions the theoretical soundness of the doctrines that define liability in workmen's compensation cases must proceed on the assumption that it is permissible to criticize a bad egg without having to lay a better one. The doctrines necessarily have characteristics that smack of tort concepts; any theory that shifts economic
loss from the person on whom it originally falls to another person,
because of their relationship, presupposes that the relationship itself
somehow was responsible for the original loss. This is the foundation
of causation, and the foundation remains the same whether the structure is the symmetrical building of proximate cause or the unsightly
lean-to built around "arising out of and in the course of the employment." Workmen's compensation legislation is an intensely practical
measure.1 00 If the structure does not sway too much in the wind it
matters little that the architecture is homely.
It is not surprising that the avid proponents of increased liability
in workmen's compensation berate those who employ tort concepts
to reach decisions, but it is surprising that those who objectively attempt to define the purpose of workmen's compensation expect the
new phrases to reflect inclinations that do not occur in common law
causation cases. If courts were successful in wiping the causation
slate clean of common law doctrines, it would be compelling proof
that they existed because of habit and not because of logic. This no
court is willing or able to admit.
One of the primary purposes of this legislation is to provide predictability of results in the amount of the awards as well as in the
incidence of liability. The record of settlements bears strong proof
that this purpose is being accomplished. Of the 140,000 accidents reported in 1955 to the Florida Industrial Commission, all but 5,676,
or about ninety-six per cent, were settled without the intervention
of a deputy commissioner. °1 Of the four per cent that were contested,
half were settled by stipulation or in conference with deputy commissioners. 10 2 The deputies issued 2,602 orders or awards in 1955;

100"It has . . . developed into an economic measure; the purpose of which is
to not only assist the worker, but to keep purchasing power activated during
accident lay offs." 15TH ANN. REP. FLA. INDUS. COsM'N 47 (1950).
-120TH ANN. RPs. FLA. INDUS. COsM'N 13, 14 (1955).
1022,887 of the 5,676 controversies were settled. Id. at 14.
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cent of the total number, were aponly 222, or eight and a half per
10 3
pealed to the full Commission.
The full Commission categorically affirmed the orders of the
deputies in about half the cases that came before it in 1955. There
were only twenty-three outright reversals, composing ten per cent of
the orders issued by the Commission; the remaining orders were
miscellaneous modifications, dismissals, and remands. Petitions for
certiorari were lodged in the Supreme Court in sixty-four cases in
1955, and the writ was denied in forty-nine of these. 04 A denial of
certiorari is tantamount to affirmance under the practice of the Supreme Court in these cases. Only fifteen cases were the subject of reported opinions by the Supreme Court during 1955, and in only three
did the opinions contain anything helpful on the immediate problem
considered in this note.
The conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that the burden
of defining the characteristics of a compensable injury is not upon
the Florida Supreme Court. If a deputy commissioner awards compensation the chances of his order being overturned are too small
for the carrier to prosecute the case through two more review proceedings, whose costs may ultimately lie on the carrier. 05 It is no
answer to suggest that the Supreme Court has defined broad theories
of causation for use by the Commission and by deputy commissioners;
the broad theories simply do not produce concrete results. The value
of precedent in workmen's compensation lies chiefly in the fact categories described early in this note, and with their overlapping and
mutual contradictions it is no small task to place each case in the
right pigeonhole.
The primary responsibility for the direction assumed by the Florida
legislation rests with the deputy commissioners; they numbered sixteen in July, 1956, five considering cases in the Miami area. Most of
them spend over half of their time on compensation cases, and a few
spend more than seventy-five per cent of their work days discharging
their duties under the act. The only requisite that candidates for
these jobs must meet is that they be members of The Florida Bar. 06
lO3Letter, Patrick H. Mears, supra note 99.
184Ibid.

l0The costs of the proceedings at each level, including a reasonable attorney's

fee, are assessable against the unsuccessful employer or carrier. FLA. STAT.

§40.34

(1955).

lOOFLA. STAT. §440.44(4)(a) (1955) specifically exempts deputy commissioners
from the required qualifications established by the merit system. Sec. 440.44(4)(b)
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They receive salaries of 5400 to $600 per month, depending upon the
area they serve. Inasmuch as the claimants are represented by lawyers
in about ninety-five per cent of the cases before deputies and in about
ninety-nine per cent of the cases heard by the full Commission, the
proceedings probably would take on the complexities of a full-fledged
judicial proceeding were it not for the continuing efforts of the deputies to avoid those characteristics.
The fact that workmen's compensation legislation as a program
is wholly commendable does not automatically justify the judicial
capitulation that has occurred in this field. Unless the legislature
is prepared to accept the Herculean task of framing a theory of
compensation broad enough to cover unlimited fact situations yet specific enough to provide predictable results, the time is ripe for recognition that the measure of liability in these cases is the length of the deputy's foot. If, as is apparent, no deduction can safely be drawn from a
given decision, the theoretical inconsistency between the cases should
be accepted as the price of justice in each case rather than camouflaged under all-embracing but meaningless phrases in judicial opinions. Theoretical inconsistency in this context is not necessarily an
evil; unlike the circuit judge in an ordinary tort case, the deputy commissioner cannot give a jury general recitations of the law and expect
it to allocate the risks according to the facts. The deputy commissioner
must determine both law and fact, and confusion of the two is inevitable. Thus the inconsistency that would appear in tort cases if
they were classified by verdicts as well as by instructions given the
jury is a reality in workmen's compensation.
If these inconsistencies are consciously tolerated by the legislature,
all the uniformity that is necessary could be maintained by a review
body, logically the Industrial Commission, to which every case could
be appealed and from which no case could be appealed as of right.
Theoretically, review in the Supreme Court by certiorari is not review by right; but, since the Court entertains arguments on the merits
in briefs and oral arguments theoretically designed only to point out
why certiorari should be granted, the difference between appeal and
certiorari is one of name only. A new rule to the effect of confining
review by certiorari to those cases in which manifest procedural errors
enables the Commission to appoint as deputies any persons admitted to the practice
of law in this state who are not otherwise involved in workmen's compensation
litigation. The Commission has imposed no additional requirements. Letter,
Patrick H. Mears, supra note 99.
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are committed or in which patently erroneous applications of law
are made would not reduce the time spent by the Court or the expense incurred by the litigants, since a litigant would still be entided to argue that his case falls within these limits. If the Supreme
Court wishes to relieve itself of the burden of considering sixty-four
cases a year, 07 either because it recognizes that the legislation is better
directed by the Industrial Commission or because these cases collectively consume more of its time than the amount of the awards
justify, it may do so by granting certiorari in as few cases as possible.
This conscious application of judicial restraint would eventually
result in the filing of fewer petitions for certiorari, because unsuccessful claimants and carriers would learn that they throw good money
after bad by asking for Supreme Court review as a matter of course.
Those whose legal sensibilities are offended by the idea that this
would make a court of the Industrial Commission should realize that
this body is already very much a court.
Until the review procedure for workmen's compensation cases is
changed, uncertainty will remain in identification of the forum that
is directing the Florida compensation law. When the full Commission
affirms an award to a man who fractured his arm in a fall after being
stung by a bee while at work, 08 while the Supreme Court in one of
its comparatively rare utterances on the subject states that a conventioneer cannot be compensated for his fall against a chair in a
hotel lobby because it was not a peculiar risk of his employment, 0 9
there is some indication that the right hand does not know what the
left hand is doing.
ROBERT P. SMITH, JR.

lo7The Court received oral arguments and briefs in 64 cases in 1954. Letter,
Patrick H. Mears, supra note 99. This figure is approximately double that of the
annual average for the years 1949-53, when the circuit courts were used as a
stage in the review of compensation cases.
10SDavis v. Board of County Comm'rs, Claim No. U-98247, order of full
Commission April 27, 1956. No petition for certiorari was filed.
109Foxworth v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 86 So.2d 147, 151 (Fla. 1955) (dictum).
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